After September 11th: Religion, Diversity, and Social Cohesion under Globalisation by Cahill, Des & Phipps, Peter
8 Australian Religion Studies Review 
After September 11th: Religion, 
Diversity, and Social Cohesion under 
Global isation 
Des Cahill and Peter Phipps 
RMIT University 
The paper introduces the conceptual framework that gave rise to this 
collection of essays in one volume. It briefly describes the event which 
brought scholars together to discuss issues of religion and diversity 
twelve months after the events of September I th 2001. The authors 
argue for three organising themes for thinking through these issues, 
put briefly: the changing nature of religious identity, growing 
religious diasporas and multi-faith societies, and the emergent 
notion of global risk as a mechanism of nation-state and multilateral 
relations with religious formations. The article is critical of the 
notion of social capital as it is commonly used, arguing that this 
concept subsumes religious, spiritual and community life under a 
category that is insidiously instrumental. 
After September 11th: Religion, Diversity, and Social Cohesion 
under Globalisation 
This collection of papers grew out of a three day colloquium on Religion and 
Globalization hosted by the RMIT Globalism Institute in Melbourne in September 
2002, commemorating the first anniversary of the September 11th events in the 
United States. The colloquium was a collaboration between RMIT and UCLA in 
association with the World Conference of Religions for Peace (WCRP). About 
forty scholars, researchers and religious leaders came together to reflect on the 
aftermath of "9111" or "S 11 ", as it has come to be known (displacing the other 
lesser-known and very different September 11 's of Chile and Melbourne) and on 
the deeper theoretical and practical issues that pertain to the interface between faith 
communities, cultures and societies in a globalizing world. If it was not already 
glaringly apparent, S 11 has brought religion back to the centre stage of social and 
political commentary and concern, and is likely to remain one of the key concerns 
of social theorists and observers over the next decade. 
The events of September 11 and their aftermath of cynical warfare and 
misplaced reprisals have brought into sharp focus the intensification of connections 
between religion and key aspects of globalization. These include the formation of 
cultural, linguistic and religious diasporas, transnational faith communities, the 
tension between heterogeneity and homogenization, the consequences of the 
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politics of identity and of grievance, the reinvigoration and invention of different 
types of fundamentalisms and religious revivalisms that cut across assumptions 
that modernisation leads to secularisation, the emergence and growth of newer 
global religious movements, the unmooring of identities, the ambivalence of 
'home', the changing role and repositioning of the nation state with the rise of 
global cities and the apparently endless growth in urban-rural division. Religion is 
at the core, or close to the core, of most of these issues. 
Nothing illustrates these ambivalences quite so succinctly as the 
pronouncements directly surrounding the destruction of the World Trade Centre 
and the resulting deaths. The spontaneous creation of shrines and memorials on the 
fence surrounding the site and other parts of New York City were not unlike the 
wayside shrines and memorials created at the sites of car fatalities. These 
memorials sometimes adopt a religious character or religious symbolism, but are 
joined by national flags, photos, love-letters and other memorabilia in the service 
of an often secular or pan-faith testament to the bonds of affection, family love and 
the routines of daily life which have been so violently broken. These memorials, 
even the most secular, sacralise the memory of the fallen. Cusack and Digance (in 
this volume) provide a fascinating account of various secular and religious 
responses to the September 11 events. They point to the complexities and variety 
of spiritual responses to the notion of national trauma. In the context of the World 
Trade Centre memorialising there was another illustrative ambivalence: we were 
frequently reminded by media reports and official pronouncements that a large 
number of the people killed in the World Trade Centre were both elite 
multinational workers and low-wage casual and illegal immigrant workers from 
many countries. At times the events of that day were represented as a tragic, shared 
loss for the global community, but more commonly the events have been 
remembered and sacralised as a specifically national 'American' tragedy, as part of 
a campaign for the very 'American' responses and reprisals that we have seen in the 
past two years. 
The immediate task of the colloquium was to map the key issues at this 
point in the interface between religion and globalization. Some of the fundamental 
questions that emerged were: how do religious organizations and traditions engage 
with the political dimensions of social life in a globalizing world while attempting 
to remain loyal to their religious and spiritual traditions? What was the role of 
faith communities in the so-called Dialogue among Civilizations, being debated in 
the UN in November 2001 and can religions help provide the hoped-for, but 
perhaps illusory 'peace dividend' promised by the boosters of globalization? There 
was much talk at the colloquium of the fashionable concept of 'social capital' as 
some of the papers in this collection attest, talk that raises as many questions for 
studies of religion as it appears to answer: might it not also be possible that the 
mode of thought that abstracts the social as a support to processes of accumulation 
and exploitation might be offensive to the masses of the world's populations and 
their various religions for whom the social is a sacred manifestation of forces 
beyond accumulation of surplus value? What becomes of 'social capital' if the 
social is a 'divine' end in itself? While certain kinds of religious identity seem to 
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be at the core of much contemporary violence and destruction, perhaps there 
remains in these tarnished traditions, the core of something that might offer a way 
out of the even greater destruction we are bringing on each other through these 
global processes of hyper-accumulation and exploitation. 
Variants ofthe social capital argument, according to Scanlon (2000, 57) take 
it as an article of faith that "the renaissance of community. (is linked) to the 
proliferation of new technologies, particularly telecommunications and information 
technologies. Community is claimed to offer the 'optimal', even natural setting for 
economic, political and social organization in a pluralistic, globalized information 
society .... they claim that community can be rethought in the form of the networks 
of information and economic exchange that underlie late capitalism." In this 
context public discussion about the revolution in information technologies have 
moved from a consideration of information technology on focussed on the 
technologies themselves, to ICT emphasising their communications aspect, to 1ST 
emphasising the social. The 1ST research emphasis, especially in Europe, is being 
linked to the notion of society and its interface with virtual realities and the impact 
on social relationships such as cyber-dating, cyber-stalking and cyber-sex. Local 
lives as embodied persons have been conjoined with virtUal worlds as virtUal 
beings with instant· global contact for more and more people educated under 
regimes of modernity. In such a world with new technologies and new 
understandings, the place of religion has become a reanimated problematic. This 
dynamic includes all the inclusiveness and sense of belonging that comes with 
identifying with a global religious diaspora, and at the same time the dark 
underbelly that fosters new fundamentalisms. Is it coincidental that one of the 
heartlands for support for India's Hindu fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) has come from the highly educated and wealthy Hindu diaspora located in 
California's Silicon Valley? The online chauvinist assertions of Hindu nationalists 
offer little comfort to enthusiasts for online community as a building block of 
social capital. 
The disconnection of identity from situated community has liberated a new 
international diaspora of fundamentalisms from the lived consequences of their 
ideological ·attachments. Much as the London-based hyper-profiteers of high 
imperialism were insulated from the consequences of their fundamentalist 
attachments to accumulation of wealth (while ignoring its distribution), so too, 
cyber-nationalists and other fundamentalists have been able to support violent 
communalist causes insulated from their consequences. The Hindutva phantasm of 
an India without Muslims, or Jamat Islamia's greater-Indonesia without non-
believers is really only possible from a disembodied space outside a lived 
collectivity. As Ashis Nandy (2003) has pointed out, contrary to official state 
ideologies of multiculturalism (and church ecumenism), the secret to communal 
harmony may well ·lie in retaining the right to dislike the other communities of 
religion, caste and nation with whom one shares a social space, but to 
simultaneously fmd life without them inconceivable. 
In many parts of the world religion has become more public as it engages 
with the new technologies of proselytism and missionisation, except perhaps in the 
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Western developed countries where, with clericalism in its death throes, it decays 
behind closed doors. In the main religion in the media-focussed ftrst world has 
been privatised and relativised, conspicuous for its emergence on occasions of 
particular national tragedies such as the death of an English princess, the launching 
of an (all too frequent) war with divine blessings being sought for the troops of a 
supposedly secular state, and of course the September II events. Religion still 
retains its potency as a political force, as seen in the rise of the BJP in India, in the 
emergence of charismatic and evangelical movements in European-heritage 
countries, Islam and Judaism being used as bludgeons in the politics of the middle 
east, and the rise of the Falun Gong in contemporary China just to name a few 
examples. 
Just as religion has retained its potency in the social sphere, so it has also 
retained its capacity to be manipulated. Religion has been a factor in almost all 
local conflicts in Africa as well as being a positive factor in reconciliation in Sierra 
Leone in I999 and 2000; religion-based identity was a factor in the various stages 
of the recent Balkans saga, and religion remains an underlying factor in the major 
state-sponsored conflict hotspots such as Afghanistan, Israel and Palestine, Sri 
Lanka, Northern Ireland, Chechnya and Iraq. Perhaps most disturbingly, religious 
fundamentalism may be driving the political core of the most dangerously armed 
state that the world has ever known, with massive stockpiles of chemical, nuclear 
and biological weapons and a proven history of using them: the United States. As 
both Tariq Ali (2003) and Talal Asad (2003) remind us, the Bush administration is 
funded, staffed and held captive by a constituency that believes the Iraq war is a 
step closer to the divine plan of Armageddon, by anti-Semites who have made a 
strategic alliance with Israeli fundamentalists in their continued assault on 
Palestinian aspirations, and who have reanimated discredited notions of manifest 
destiny. 
The colloquium was asked to consider three organising themes affecting the 
notion and practices of religion in the context of globalisation. These three themes 
were roughly characterised as the following: religion and the global politics of 
identity; global ethnic and religious diaspora and the formation of multi-faith 
societies; and the emergent notion of global risk as a mechanism of nation-state 
and multilateral relations with religious formations. 
1. Religion and the Global Politics of Identity 
Partly as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, highlighted by the events 
of S II and its aftermath, there has been a reconftguration of the politics of 
identity, the politics of memory, and the politics of retribution. At the last 
Assembly of the World Conference of Religion and Peace1, held in Amman in 
November I999, its Secretary-General, Dr. William Vendley (1999: I) stated the 
new post Cold War context: 
The end of the ideologically based proxy wars in the East-West 
competition of the Cold War has given way to the rapid proliferation of 
smaller scale, more localised armed conflicts. Increasingly people have 
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sought security through identification with a group closer to their own 
experience and over which they have some control. Most violent conflicts 
today occur between identity groups within national boundaries, making 
them inter-group in character and internal or intra-national in scope. 
Group identity may be based on some mix of ethnicity, clan, race or 
geographical affiliation, but it also typically involves religious factors. 
Recent examples complement more ancient ones in illustrating that 
religion, insofar as it is related to how a people or culture define 
themselves, can be manipulated to become a factor in this type of conflict. 
Since 1989, there have been approximately 110 armed conflicts, eight 
between States while the rest are intra-State in nature. Part of this scenario is the 
emergence of non-State actors such as local and international warlords, ethnically 
or religiously motivated terrorist groups and money oriented criminal groups 
involved in the illegal drug or diamond trade and laundering money through safe 
havens. 
Those religious movements which are commonly described as .fundamentalist 
are generally anti-modem in outlook while being distinctly modem in formation, 
method and orientation. Peter Vander Veer (1994) has described this as "religious 
nationalism", however there seems to be something more than this at stake when 
many of these movements display a distinctly transnational or even anti-national 
dimension. Their claims to be maintaining, or more often claiming to re-enact the 
more pure traditions of the past in a corrupted present, while conducting a 
thoroughly modem jihad/crusade/holy war (take your pick). In this common faith 
narrative, believers in the current epoch have become corrupted, weak and in need 
of salvation in the form of a resurgence of the word, the book or the way, with an 
emphasis on the unflinching singularity of that way to the exclusion of all others. 
Reflecting modernity, this religious modality shows a distinct intolerance for 
ambiguity, plurality or femininity, prioritising action over reflection, and recasting 
the role of believers as hard-core action men in the service of an aggressively 
masculine divine. In this collection Vinay Lal describes this phenomenon and its 
complexity among the Hindu diaspora of the United States. Lal makes the point 
that this extremely successful and newly assertive 'Non-Resident Indian' 
population of high-tech professionals and business people suffers an anxiety of 
influence that wishes to see India, and by extension Hinduism, assert itself as an 
aggressive, military world force. 
This is public religion in competition with (and reflection of) Hollywood, 
new media, the everyday allure of commodities and the way of life 
commodification brings with it to all dimensions of the social, including religion. 
In the fundamentalist rejection of the West, commodity fetishism, and the 
supposed moral decay of late modernity, religion is recast as a distinctly modem 
mirror of these phenomena, and in the mediatised world, as increasingly 
postmodem phenomena: Dalai Lama merchandise, Pope-mobiles and telecasts, 
Osama t-shirts, websites and computer games. Van der Veer's more recent work 
(2001) shows that notions like secularism and religious fundamentalism which are 
assumed to be opposites are in fact intimately intertwined. Thus it should be no 
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surprise when we find that the key cadre of fundamentalist movements are very 
often highly educated in the technical sciences with very intimate and extended 
contact with the west. 
At a different end of the scale, Adam Possamai (this collection) describes the 
ways in which the technologies of globalisation give rise to new forms of religion, 
that even play at the edges of what religiosity is conventionally thought to be. 
Where does the growing religious affiliation from the most recent Australian 
census, 'Jedi', fit in notions of serious ecumenism? Is the Jedi faith an instance of 
postmodem irony mocking the notion of religious identity, or an emerging 
spiritual path derived from a series of Hollywood films? It would not be the first 
time film has given rise to a deity, the cult of the Hindu Goddess 'Santoshi Ma' 
was spawned from a successful Bollywood film by the same name in the 1970's. 
The work ofPossamai on New Age movements, reflected further in Bouma's close 
look at the Australian census materials, raises more questions about the status of 
religious identity. It appears that in conditions of advanced modernity, religion has 
to some extent become unmoored from community, making shifts across religious 
identities or affiliations more common and easier. Is this the emergence of a more 
cosmopolitan, less partisan approach to spiritual life, less attached to the 
hierarchies and institutions of established religion, or is it simply a reflection of 
the pick and choose identities of contemporary consumer-oriented societies such as 
Australia? One of the refreshing characteristics of this freedom or fluidity of 
identity is a tum to an emphasis on the experience of spiritual life, a concern with 
practice and encounter, over doctrine, obedience and belonging. 
2. Global Ethnic and Religious Diaspora and the Formation of 
Multi-Faith Societies 
Central to globalization has been the creation of multilayered movements of 
people such as the movements of global professionals working for international 
organizations, national governments, global social movements and transnational 
corporations. Universities are moving their students world-wide as part of the 
internationalization of their curricula, there are international contract workers and 
seafarers; older tourists and their backpacker children, conference attendees and 
religious pilgrims to places such as Mecca and Rome paying homage at their 
sacred sites. As economic expectations have risen, there are the permanent migrants 
together with border-hoppers, and as inter-ethnic conflicts rise, growing numbers of 
asylum claimants and refugees, victims of ethnic cleansing and growing numbers 
of people looking for the better future they see possible each night in the dreams 
projected on their television scre.ens. There are growing numbers of environmental 
refugees with more to come as sea levels rise, small island nations are inundated 
and weather patterns change. Also to be noted is the rise of international marriages, 
a very accurate barometer of inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations. Love takes 
little notice of border sentry-posts, and the old Chinese saying that "a chicken does 
not marry a duck" is increasingly irrelevant - yet religious and ethnic community 
leaders have varied enormously in their reaction to such inter-faith and intercultUral 
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marriages from outright condemnation and ostracization to quiet antipathy to 
genuine ambivalence or to perhaps a resigned and even warm acceptance of the 
inevitable. 
This reconfiguration of national and religious profiles implies that religious 
pluralism cannot be wished away nor can the intermingling of cultures and 
religions be synthesized into a syncretist amalgam in some form of global culture 
and global religion. As Scott Philipps (this volume) points out, living in a 
multifaith society entails certain responsibilities and commitments at the local 
level if communication between communities is to have any depth to it. Also as a 
consequence of mass migration, diasporas, to a greater or lesser extent, create a 
transnational ethnic economy and a transnational public sphere which influences 
the nuances of their local debates, overtly or covertly in discourse or perhaps little 
known to their host countries. The information revolution means they can more 
easily be networked across time and space; if these diasporas provide cities with 
multicultural colour and cuisine, they also can provide cover for religious 
encapsulation and, for international criminal syndicates and terrorist organisations 
and their operative cells. 
3. Global Risk, Global Governance: Religion and the State 
After September 11th, never again can we look at skyscrapers in the same 
way. These steel and concrete cathedrals. are now symbols of the risk and 
unpredictability of the future. For more than a decade, theorists like Ulrich Beck 
(1992) have been writing about the 'world risk society', about the risk of a 
backlash against the West; they have spoken about the link between risk, 
responsibility and trust, and of "organized irresponsibility" and the 'limited 
controllability' of the dangers the world faces, the dangers from the disorganized 
capitalist market, of the polluted environment, of fanatical terrorist groups, and of 
the destruction of traditions of wisdom and scholarship. Mervyn Bendle (in this 
volume) points to the war being waged on the non-fundamentalist traditions of 
Islam, Sufism in particular, whose scholarly and mystical orientations are seen as 
anathema by those asserting a very narrow doctrinal view of Islam. 
The management of some very narrowly understood risks have become a 
major concern for governments post-S 11. The massive boosts to airport and 
infrastructure security, the widespread and highly controversial use of 'ethnic 
profiling', the formation of a United States mega- 'Department of Homeland 
Security', are all (perhaps belated and contradictory) attempts to manage perceived 
risks to security. The irony is of course, these 'get tough' measures create the 
climate of fear and compliance that mobilises populations into a more sedirnented 
oppositional framework: people inevitably become the terrorist/criminal/fanatic the 
state identifies them as under conditions of extreme repression. While massive 
military mobilisations and human rights abuses are carried out or tolerated in the 
name of this "war against terror", what appears to be the reassertion of a distinctly 
American form of global expansion creates endless new forms of resistance and 
resentment. While the United Nations and many others call for a more considered, 
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peaceful and long-term approach to questions of national and global security linked 
to global justice, the United States and its most unflinching allies create the 
conditions for further violence. 
Focus has now shifted to the notion of social capital, which has been 
described as the silent partner in global change, the resource for global and local 
action and a potential source of major social improvements. As John Montgomery 
(200 1: 1) has commented, social capital "is not displayed in almanacs, stock 
market reports or tourist advertisements; its presence has to be discovered through 
intuition or diligent rationalism. Yet it is ubiquitous; it is so often invoked to 
enhance desired behaviour in the present or to bring about purposeful change for 
the future". It is supposed to be reflected in the stability and solidity of 
institutions; it highlights trust and its maximization in public life; it underpins 
and influences the flows of communicating and associating between individuals 
and collective entities like religious communities and ethnic groups and between 
nations; it gives nations "competitive advantages" in the international economic 
race or in responding to international crises and national disasters; it can help to 
achieve social justice by improving distributive justice; it can foster and facilitate 
grassroots change and initiatives. Yet despite these remarkable claims, social 
capital is used as a new bludgeon against the third world and communities that 
foster religious extremism. No longer is western exploitation, the maldistribution 
of resources or the years of super-power proxy wars to blame for global poverty, 
extremism and instability, rather it is the lack of 'social capital' in those societies 
that is the problem ... 'if only they could be more like us' goes the new catch-cry. 
This sounds remarkably similar to an earlier phase of imperialism where the 
natives were constantly castigated for their lack, their 'not-yet' status in modernity 
and democracy, necessitating rule from the stable, modem metropolitan centres of 
empire. 
I van Strenski (in this volume) articulates the role Christian religious ideology 
has played in the development of global capitalism and this particular phase of 
globalisation. His argument that the Catholic Church was in some ways a model 
for the transnational institutions of our times raises fascinating questions about the 
repressed theological content of notions of transnational governance. The further set 
of questions explored by the colloquium under this theme included: the building 
of global social coalitions through a global faiths agenda, the role of education in 
inter-faith interaction and co-operation, the movement for a global ethic or the 
articulation of an international covenant for religious rights and responsibilities, 
religion and the construct social capital in addressing poverty, inequality and 
human rights abuses, and the role and effects of business in community life. 
In a globalised world characterised by Arjun Appadurai (1996) as being 
usefully conceived as an uneven geography of ideoscapes, financescapes, 
mediascapes, ethnoscapes and technoscapes, the role ofthe nation state has changed 
because it is inescapably vulnerable to global processes. Despite Kenichi Ohmae's 
(1995) claim that the nation state is increasingly "a nostalgic fiction", it continues 
to display a remarkable tenacity. Each nation state has had to reposition itself in 
the fractal global neighbourhood. This raises the question of faith-state 
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relationships which has been expressed in the apparent dialectic of the supposed 
separation of religion and state on the one hand, and the close configuration 
between religion and government in theocratic states on the other. Neither extreme 
characterisation is particularly helpful, and closer examination of state-religious 
relations is defmitely called for. As Paul James points out in this volume, 
American secularism has a distinctive and peculiar form when it comes to the 
national narrative of 'manifest destiny'. Talal Asad reminds us· this peculiar secular 
society displays remarkably different characteristics to the secularism of Republican 
France, and so too from the Establishment church headed by the monarch in Great 
Britain. The role of states is central in defining the social and political limits in 
which religion can be a counter-cultural force providing a critique of dominant 
social forms and concerns. 
Religious traditions have an inherent tendency to refer to the past for this 
social critique, even if they are also fundamentally oriented to a this-world or 
beyond-world future. In the creation of civil societies, religion cannot be left to one 
side. They are handcuffed (much like the nation-state) to an imagined, if not 
imaginary, past that is often based on poor history. There are extremes in each 
religious tradition that can become locked into their enclosed world-view. Boys, 
Lee and Bass (1995: 256) argue for a pluralistic religious orientation that reflects 
the liberal values to which they aspire: 
What our world needs is men and women whose religious commitments 
are both clear and ambiguous, rooted and adaptive, particular and 
pluralistic, yet this would not be sufficient: in addition, we must probe 
our traditions so that we can identify and eradicate the pathologies that 
have contributed to inquisitions, holy wars, obscurantisms and 
exclusivisms ... religiously committed men and women (who) come to 
the public forum with powerful and necessary · tools for the 
transformation of the world. They bring the sacred into the public realm. 
Ireland and Baker (in this volume) consider the role of new religious 
movements as a social force. Their detailed analysis of a number of new religious 
movements shows that fear of these movements as a disruptive or potentially 
violent social force is largely unfounded. Hughes (this volume) comes to asimilar 
conclusion from his Australian survey work, that religious identity is not 
necessarily divisive or undermining of trust in contemporary Australia. Global 
faith communities would seem to have to confront one fundamental and three other 
challenges. The fundamental one is the attitude to religious pluralism, a religious 
pluralism that ensures peaceful co-existence and avoids any evangelical and forced 
conversion but allowing fluidity, conversion and reciprocity. Ninian Smart (1996) 
has developed the twin notions of "soft non-relativism" and "infederated 
complementarity" to inform a religious pluralist view based on the three 
propositions (a) no world-view or revelation is susceptible of proof, so certitude is 
not possible (b) not all world-views teach compatible theses so there exists a 
rivalry even if there is considerable overlap - given the uncertainty, the only 
possible stance is soft non-relativism and (c ) a multicultural stance implies a 
positive stance towards the different religions and world-views which complement 
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each other and have something to teach each other whilst they co-exist in a world-
wide federation. What are the implications of this changing, diverse, disjunctional, 
multi-faith landscape for the relationship between the state and religion? 
Vendley (1999) reports that in Amman late in 1999, for the first time, 23 
religious leaders from Bosnia-Herzogovina were brought together as a group. At 
the end of the colloquium, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia-Herzogovina, the Orthodox 
Metropolitan and the Catholic Cardinal each reported the only antidote to the 
hatred that had spread in the south-east of Europe was to be found in the 
cornerstones of spirituality: the practice of love for other living beings and respect 
for peace. The Mufti spoke of the 'many problems in front of us' and the difficulty 
of 'learning how to communicate with each other'. He commented, 'human blood 
has no nationality, no religion, no culture'. It can only be hoped that these themes 
to be found in most substantive religious traditions can prevail in times when 
absolutist creeds of destruction and domination of difference are resurgent in 
religious life, and in the all-consuming, commodifying, modernising powers 
which they reflect. 
Endnotes 
1
• This organisation is the world's largest coalition of religious leaders working for 
peace and religious and social harmony. 
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